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To date there is continuing expansion of counselling, psychotherapy and counselling psychology training programmes within universities in the UK. For some time now, the uneasy alliance between the differing ‘cultures’ of counselling on one side and of teaching and learning in universities on the other has been questioned (eg. Berry and Woolfe 1997), and indeed a recent special edition of the European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counselling and Health (2002) was devoted entirely to this issue.

Whilst many of these and other papers take issue with university structures which hinder or promote psychotherapeutic training, less has been said about the psychological strains which may be experienced by psychotherapeutic teams working within the context of contemporary higher education. Waller (2002), in discussing this, has pointed out the growing difficulties in recruitment to such teams and argues that  ‘poor pay, a poor working environment and lack of support staff add to the stress of running programmes and especially those that have public safety at their core’ ( p. 401).  

 From a psychoanalytic perspective, it may be argued that these and other such problems are likely to be at least partially a function of the social defence system of the organization within which a psychotherapeutic team works. In this theoretical paper, I would like to draw on the Kleinian developmental view of anxiety and Isabel Menzies-Lyth’s (1959) work on social defence systems to argue that there are enormous anxieties aroused by the assimilation of psychotherapeutic training programmes within universities. I will explore some of the ways psychotherapeutic teaching teams may be at risk of becoming the locus of unconsciously split-off emotional aspects of the institution, and try to develop an understanding of the position and anxieties of such teams within a university setting. Some brief suggestions for future practice are outlined.


Anxiety and social defence systems: a psychoanalytic perspective


The management and containment of anxiety is seen as a central issue in contemporary psychoanalytic formulations of group and organizational problems. Much theorizing in the area has focused on Klein’s contribution to understanding the specific constellations of anxieties and defences characteristic of the early paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions  (Klein 1935, 1940, 1946; Segal 1973). 

Particular interest has been paid to the concept of projective identification, seen by Klein(1946) as one of the earliest defence mechanisms by which the developing infant protects itself against internal persecutory anxieties deriving from the death instinct. It refers to an unconscious phantasy whereby the infant, unable to reconcile ambivalent feelings of love and hate, locates its unwanted or intolerable feelings in the object which then becomes identified with the split-off aspects of the self.  This splitting of good and bad experiences, together with other primitive defences such as fragmentation, introjection and idealization may be contrasted with more ‘depressive ‘ functioning where the infant begins to realize his feelings of love and hate are directed at a single object. It is from this move towards psychic integration that feelings of concern for the object emerge, giving rise to feelings of loss, guilt and the desire for reparative activity. 

Individuals are thought to continue to fluctuate between the two mental positions in adulthood, reworking the difficulties of depressive integration within each major developmental stage throughout life: indeed, the capacity for symbolization, creativity and rational thought may be attenuated where individuals retain and deploy the primitive defences characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position (Segal 1957).

In the normal course of projective identification, we are able both to project into and subsequently withdraw projections from others, in order to understand their point of view whilst retaining our own perspective: the ability to empathise, for example, depends on this process. Steiner (1993) points out that under emotional pressure or mental pain such reversibility may be blocked: the individual now cannot withdraw the projection and so remains out of touch with the aspect of the self unconsciously located inside the object it is identified with. This not only results in depletion of the projector’s ego, but also in the distortion of the object, which may now unconsciously experience, embody and enact the split-off and denied aspects of the projector. Segal (1973) points out that the unconscious motivation behind such projection varies: ‘bad parts of the self may be projected in order to get rid of them as well as to attack and destroy the object, good parts may be projected to avoid separation or keep them safe from bad things inside or to improve the external object through a kind of primitive projective reparation.’ ( 1973 p.27-8).

The clinical consequences of the above scenario, particularly the ways in which projective identification comes to be ‘played out’ in the consulting room in the relationship between client and therapist, have received much attention in contemporary psychoanalytic literature. However, the use of primitive projective processes is also thought to be characteristic in the management of unconscious anxiety within groups. Bion (1961) for example, makes a distinction between the ‘work group’ and the ‘basic assumption’ group. The former is a group that is conceptualized as able to engage in shared work activities, co-operating to fulfil the group’s primary task and responsibilities.  However, in an uncertain or complex environment, where anxiety levels are high, ‘basic assumptions’ and phantasies may come to predominate, and the mental state of the group may come to be characterized by a more primitive constellation of defences, affects and phantasies underpinned and driven by the need for emotional security. The resulting defensive splitting and projective mechanisms outlined by Klein (1946) and Steiner (1993) above are thought to ensure that individual members now take up roles and emotional relationships within the group’s phantasy, thus undermining the real work or task of the institution. Bion went on to identify a number of mechanisms such as fight/flight, dependency and pairing which groups will resort to under intense strain or pressure. The ‘basic assumption’ group mentality is thus seen by Bion as a defence against the anxiety of uncertainty, chaos and ‘not knowing’; one that leads many organizations to construct particular routines and procedures that operate as social defence systems sabotaging the group’s primary task.

Isabel Menzies-Lyth’s (1959) psychoanalytic study of nursing found that many of the organizational features of hospitals functioned as defences against the primitive anxieties outlined by Bion. Examining the unconscious reasons why nurses in the health service became increasingly reluctant to look after the sick and vulnerable patients in their care, she found that the anxieties the hospital environment aroused in nurses bore:

 “a striking resemblance to the phantasy situations that exist in every individual in the deepest and most primitive levels of the mind. The intensity and complexity of nurse’s anxieties are to be attributed primarily to the peculiar capacity of objective features of her work situation to stimulate afresh those early situations and their accompanying emotions” ( 1988, pp 46-7).









Many studies since Menzies-Lyth’s, including those by eg. Nightingale and Scott (1994); Hinshelwood and Skogstad (2000; 2002); and Morante (2005) have used a psychoanalytic perspective to observe, understand and enhance the functioning of mental health professionals within the NHS. However, there has been far less interest in those professionals working within the education sector. Whilst Obholzer (1987) has pointed out the profound unconscious significance and value of the Health Service to the public, I think there can be little doubt of a similar strength of unconscious feeling about the education system within society. 

Along with health, it is a government’s educational policy – its stance towards standards, teacher’s pay, equity of provision and fees as well as curriculum, qualifications, quality of teaching and training etc – that is the topic of political pressure, discussion and often bitter dispute. Arguably, the ostensible task of an education system is to produce citizens and leaders who are able to contribute to the smooth running of society; to produce, teach and train individuals who will provide for the next generation. Embedded within this is the progress myth: education enables us to provide better; we will have new ideas which can be developed, perpetuated and disseminated to a community, society or group which will thereby be advantaged.  At an unconscious level, then, we might argue from this that a university or institution of higher education is profoundly identified with the mind, or the intellect, which is valued and nurtured as a sign of progress and evolution in society. The consistent privileging of cognition over emotion within university education is one example of this unconscious group identification.
 
Armstrong (1991) has used Bion’s concept of the ‘institutionalised work group’ to argue that all institutions act as containers for thought. Thoughts and ideas need space in which to grow and disseminate, a vehicle through which they may be developed, criticized and digested in preparation for being made available to society. Bion (1970) pointed out that work taking place within organizations acts as a safeguard against the unconscious anxiety evoked by the potential catastrophic loss of ideas and thought. Whilst the fear of chaos, uncertainty, ‘not knowing’ and loss of mind that Bion refers to may be anxieties experienced by any organization, I would like to suggest that they are anxieties that may be experienced as particularly potent for institutions of higher education whose role in and professional responsibility for the intergenerational transmission of thought and knowledge is felt to be crucial. Indeed, in so far as universities or institutions of higher education unconsciously identify themselves with the intellect and its capacity to think, it may be that these are the anxieties against which they most strongly defend. 

Within the last two decades, we have seen a major restructuralising of our universities. Shore and Wright (1999) have pointed to the rise of the ‘audit culture’ within British higher education, framed in terms of ‘quality’, ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’, giving rise to what they term as ‘a new form of coercive neo-liberal governmentality’ (Foucault 1991). In line with this, Bourdieu (1998), writing from a sociological perspective argues:

 ‘A whole set of presuppositions is being imposed as self-evident: it is taken for granted that maximum growth, and therefore productivity and competitiveness are the ultimate and sole goals of human actions; or that economic forces cannot be resisted…’ (p.30-31). 

For universities, as with all public sector organizations, this means a culture of increasing standardization, competition, new regulatory procedures, quality assurance mechanisms and audit systems. The prevailing logic of the panoptican, or total visibility culture, has raised enormous anxieties and uncertainties within institutions to which many have responded by increasing levels of bureaucracy and authoritarian management.  Lawrence (1995) suggests:

‘As the environment is experienced as becoming more uncertain….the management of institutions become more anxious….as they interpret their experience of the events and happenings of the business relating to its environment. This activates and evokes dormant psychotic anxieties because their phantasy world comes more to the fore than the conscious ratiocinating qualities of the mind. So there is a pressure on managers to bring into being organizations which offer certainty that in fantasy will withstand the environmental uncertainty and banish the psychotic anxieties. In this they are supported by the majority of the other role holders in the institutions. (p.2).

Hirschorn (1997) too, has pointed out that the demise of traditional organizational forms has created a sense of ‘market risk’ in the work-place, which inevitably creates a sense of vulnerability in individuals. This vulnerability, he suggests, sets the stage

‘for a more primitive psychology. Individuals question their own competence and their ability to act autonomously. In consequence, just when the need to build a more sophisticated psychological culture, they inadvertently create a more primitive one’           ( p.27). 

Bollas (1999) has used the term ‘fascist state of mind’ to describe individuals whose tenacity in holding on to a belief, an ideology, a conviction or a theory maintains a spurious sense of certainty thought the elimination of all opposition. Lawrence (1995) goes on to claim that a similar process may occur at an organizational level where members of a group:

‘ collectively bring into being, consciously and unconsciously, authoritarian organizations that generate a totalitarian, possibly fascist, state-of-mind in the participants in the institution’ (p.2).

Within some institutions of higher education, practices that might be termed totalitarian include: the blanket imposition of contracts on staff; an emphasis on compliance rather than negotiation with management; the standardization, homogenization and modularization of training courses; frequent, unexplained changes to timetables and routines; unremitting levels of repetitive administration; threats to job security. In this kind of environment, independent thought that differs from the prevailing culture may come to be seen as, and indeed may actually be, in the case of union or strike action, an aggressive act against the institution. (There is an irony here with which many in higher education will be familiar: that an institution whose pre-eminent role is to think is forced to introduce practices and policies that make thinking impossible).
 




Unconscious anxiety within the university


From the above Kleinian perspective, it is likely that the kind of organizational changes referred to above will result in increased use of defences such as splitting and projection within universities. Splitting is most likely to occur along pre-existing fissures, the most traditional of which is the Aristotelian divide between reason and emotion in academic learning. Parker (2002) has recently drawn attention to the ways in which universities tend to privilege cognition over emotion, not just in their teaching but in the very infrastructure of the validation, accreditation and quality assurance mechanisms that are now increasingly demanded by audit procedures. This split I think may be perceived as particularly relevant within psychology departments where Rustin (2003) has pointed out that:

‘Perception, cognition and memory have been constructed in academic psychology as discrete mental functions, best investigated and analysed separately from the matrix of feelings in which human practice they are invariably embedded. No doubt some specific understandings have been achieved as a consequence of the academic division of labour,  though this has until recently left emotions as the poor relation of psychological science’ ( p. 188). 

This split between reason and emotion or experiential and academic knowledge has led to a form of what Parker (2002) sees as defensive intellectualization within university discourse. One of the consequences of this, arising, he suggests, from the constant pressure to translate the subject matter of teaching into written, cognitive accounts of ‘transferable knowledge’ for quality assurance purposes is that:

‘The ‘cognitive’ explication of what is going on assumes privilege over the unconscious in such a way that the domain of ‘emotion’ is constituted as its other’ (p.338).  

A disjunction between rationality and feeling means the institution may fail to engage meaningfully with the affective aspects of teaching and learning. More pertinently to a psychoanalytic perspective, I would suggest that where these tectonic plates abut, there runs a ‘fault line’ within the university; where emotions - academic psychology’s ‘poor relation’, as Rustin (2003) suggests above -  are likely to re-emerge if only to be registered on the periphery as unwanted or anxiety provoking.

I think there are particular places within a university where these emotions are most likely to surface: one of these is commonly located in the staff’s interactions with students. Just as Menzies-Lyth (1959) found that it was the patients who evoked psychotic anxieties in the nurses, so in universities we find students evoking enormous anxieties in their tutors and lectures. Indeed, many of the bureaucratic procedures – for instance the strict delimitation of teaching hours, and the demise of the individual tutorial system within a university - seem to be aimed at reducing to a minimum the personal contact between staff and students and bear a marked similarity to the strict routines that Menzies-Lyth originally described in her study. The net effect of these and many other similar procedures is the overall decrease in the value and time given to establishing, maintaining and thinking about the matrix of personal and emotional relationships within which all teaching occurs. From the psychoanalytic perspective previously outlined, I want to suggest that such practices may be established to defend against the unconscious anxiety that students represent for staff. At one level, this anxiety manifests as staff feeling utterly overwhelmed with students’ endless emotional demands which they feel (and in many cases are) unable to meet or manage. At another level, these demands may unconsciously be perceived as so enormous they will actually send staff members mad, or at least render them unable to carry out their valued primary task of being able to think. 

The other ‘fault-line’ where emotional issues are likely to surface within a university, may be located, I suggest, in the psychotherapeutic teaching team itself. How does this come to be the case?  One way of beginning to understand this is to consider the unconscious significance and role of a counselling psychology or psychotherapeutic team within an academic institution. It is here that an understanding of the phenomenon of projective identification, a mechanism of considerable subtlety and sophistication, may be useful.

 Contemporary psychoanalytic theory and practice has become increasingly interested in the ways in which the most vulnerable and subjective parts of the therapist unconsciously come to be sought out, elicited and amplified by the client within the therapeutic relationship and the difficulties for the therapist in bearing and thinking about this. Writers such as Searles (1978), Symington (1986) and Young (1994), for instance, have argued that the patient’s unconscious projections may ‘latch on to’ and amplify very specific aspects of the therapist’s unconscious, who then becomes intersubjectively entwined in the therapeutic project.  I would like to suggest that much the same process applies at the organisational level, where members of academic staff may unconsciously ‘hook up’ with the relational and reparative project of the psychotherapeutic teaching team. Indeed, it is likely that this process may be particularly salient in the case of counselling psychology teams whose presence within an academic psychology department may come to constitute a quite specific challenge to traditional approaches to psychology. 

Strawbridge (2006) points out that:

‘whereas psychology has traditionally adopted a ‘modern’ natural science attitude towards inquiry and takes an authoritative position in relation to the application of its finding for the benefit of others, I think the counselling psychology challenges psychology to become a human science. In its therapeutic practice, it seeks to be more egalitarian and collaborative and adopts an attitude of co-operative inquiry. It recognizes that therapy is relational and affects both client and therapist and its stance is caring rather than care-taking….’ (p.29). 

Just as the discipline of counselling psychology may challenge the natural science model of psychology that Strawbridge refers to, so the essentially relational project of the counselling psychology team may, in some circumstances, constitute an existential challenge to the academic psychology department of which it finds itself a member. One of the most important aspects of psychotherapeutic work is its focus on and attention to emotional contact and psychological repair between human beings. Thinking about another’s experience, about another’s mind, is central to any form of therapeutic work, as is the capacity for self-reflection and mentalisation (Fonagy and Target 1996).  Moreover, the teaching of therapeutic skills demands extremely close attention to the student’s personal experience and how his or her subjectivity translates into clinical work. 

It is this very close attention to emotional work that I see as an unerring object of unconscious projections by academic staff within the university setting. Whilst a counselling psychology team may constitute a particularly salient target for such projections, I think the same is likely to be the case for all counselling and psychotherapeutic teaching teams that have a core relational philosophy. Hinshelwood (1994) has argued that the relevance of psychotherapy within some clinical institutions may lie in its unconscious role in representing a split off, projected and disowned aspect of the service. Given what I have characterized as an over-identification with mind within the culture of some universities, it possible that a psychotherapeutic team’s interest in and focus on emotional contact represents the institution’s ‘shadow side’, the feeling or relational aspect of its task that has been lost, disowned and located in a psychotherapeutic team. If this is so, I think we must expect universities to be highly ambivalent towards all such teams. Concerns about developing and maintaining high levels of university-accredited academic attainment, sponsored and underpinned by the recent explosion of psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology training programmes offered at doctoral level, may mask other concerns and anxieties:  the feared potential for emotional chaos that the presence of psychotherapy staff and trainees represents; or the organisation’s own worry and guilt about their unwillingness or inability to engage fully with the emotional and training requirements of a therapeutic profession.

Any defensive splitting of emotional and intellectual aspects of the institution is thus likely to be played out in a split between the teaching team and the other members of academic and administrative staff. As repository of the university’s split-off affective experience, I think the psychotherapeutic team is likely to be both idealised and denigrated. It may be idealized (and envied) for its reparative capacity, its phantasied ability to heal, as well as its perceived capacity to cope with the complexities of emotional relationships from which many university staff are distanced. However, the team may also be denigrated and marginalized as representing dangerous contact with emotions and relationships that are unconsciously agreed to be antithetical to the safety of the institution and against which it rigorously defends. An example of this is the reluctance on the part of a university to allocate the necessary staff to small-group tutorial or seminar teaching. Teams that request such staffing levels are seen as greedy, demanding and unreasonable in contrast to other university staff who ‘get by’ on lecturing to groups of 50-100 students. (Waller (2002) points out that terms such as ‘favourable’, ‘privileged’, or ‘generous’ are frequently used to describe the necessarily higher staff-student ratios in therapy training programmes demanded by regulatory bodies). Other examples may include the lack of support staff allocated to teams; problems in agreeing time for necessary clinical placement visits; and many other such difficulties.

These difficulties I suspect may be indicative of the profound significance of having a teaching team within the university whose unconscious role is experienced as helping people in psychological distress. This is in contrast to a team’s more overt role in structuring and providing a post-graduate training programme for students. As ‘experts’ in mental health, the team may be unconsciously experienced as an appropriate locus for the disowned anxiety, vulnerability and confusion of the university; their willing contact with emotions and fragility means that they may be seen, particularly by managerial staff, as the best people to deal with others’ unwanted feelings. (Indeed, it is possible that teams may be induced, via projective identification, to act out in ways that confirm to the university the difficulties, danger and potentially disastrous consequences of psychological contact). 


The role of the team within the university


The above distinction between the covert and overt roles of a psychotherapeutic team within the university has much in common with Lawrence and Robinson’s (1975) distinction between the normative and existential primary tasks of an organization. The normative primary task is the job that individuals are supposed to pursue according to authorities within an organization. The existential primary task, however, is the task which individuals value and believe they ‘should’ be carrying out. Optimally, the normative and existential primary tasks of an organization work in tandem, contributing to the smooth running of the organization. However, where the normative and existential tasks are out of alignment, the result is the ‘phenomenal’ primary task; the job that individuals are enagaged in ‘and of which they may not be consciously aware’  (Miller 1993, p. 17).

A psychotherapeutic team’s normative primary task could be thought of as delivering a post-graduate training programme, within a defined budget, according to professionally established guidelines and criteria. A counselling psychology team, in particular, already heavily identified with the academic discipline of psychology, is likely to come under great pressure to conform to the normative primary tasks common to the all members of the psychology department. However, the existential task of the team may be considered by some if not all of its members as rather different, and may include a variety of other values, expectations and perceived roles: modelling a humanistic philosophy of therapeutic practice; nurturing and developing students’ self-awareness and psychological growth; providing a space for self and trainee development, to name only a few. 

One of the most common ways of dealing with this lack of alignment between normative and existential tasks, may be for psychotherapeutic teams to undertake, wholesale, the work that seems to be required by the university: in other words, to stick to the normative primary task. Such teams and  individuals within them may focus almost entirely on what the university consciously expects of them: to increase student numbers, to deliver a uniform training programme according to professional accreditation criteria, to produce research papers, to attend all meetings,  to stick to deadlines.  However, these requirements are likely to be experienced as uncomfortably at odds with the existential primary task, particularly where this is felt to be primarily concerned with attending to the psychological development of trainees. (Whether such a disjunction between normative and existential primary tasks is experienced to the same extent by other more established – and funded - clinical training courses such as clinical psychology, also located within academic psychology departments, is an interesting question that is beyond the scope of the current paper). Hinshelwood (1994) has pointed out that an exclusive focus on the conscious needs of an institution has an appeasing quality: in effect, the team is unconsciously attempting to placate what is felt as an unreasonably demanding institution. In the long run, he argues, this is likely to lead to burn-out. In the context of a counselling psychology or psychotherapeutic team, then, we can perhaps think of burn-out as the result of the emergent ‘phenomenal’, or unconscious primary task, - the ongoing attempt to generate a space unaware of the pressure to remain marginalized as the unconscious ambassador of a split-off aspect of the institution. 

Burn-out, of course, may be manifest in a wide variety of responses. Any therapeutic team may, in the above situation, find that continually attempting to engage with the university simply too threatening and, at an unconscious level, retreat, thus reducing its relatedness to the organization as a whole. This defensive psychological distancing not only runs the risk of a blunting of emotional contact between staff and students, but, in the worst cases, may lead to enormous despair and guilt in a therapeutic team whose relational and therapeutic role, undermined by the above gridlock of organizational defences, is now threatened. (Indeed, this is where external clinical work can provide teaching staff with particular relief, allowing reparative work to continue unimpeded elsewhere). 

Repair implies the restoration of something damaged to a fully-functioning state: the mending of damage caused by aggression (Klein 1946). Whilst not all would agree that a psychotherapeutic team has a reparative function within a university setting, it is at least possible to think of the unconscious role of such teams in terms both of restoring, acknowledging and seeking to understand the value of feeling and emotion within learning as well as, paradoxically, to sustain a ‘feeling’ presence if only on the margins of the organization. Such a reparative stance, - which arguably underpins the entire psychotherapeutic project within its current contemporary professional context - I suggest is likely to require considerable ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild 1983) on the part of a team and its members (and, indeed the various counselling and psychotherapeutic professions) and to contribute in no small part to the ongoing stresses and strains referred to by Waller(2002).

Moving forward: reflections and suggestions.


That psychotherapeutic teams may become gridlocked within the organizational dynamics of a university setting will not be news to many professionals working in the field. However, it is clear that independent training institutions too may have their own problems. Coren (2002) describes his own training:

“We studied in a context that lacked transparent structures, procedures, containment or guidance. There was an absence of any appeals procedure, any mechanism for representing the student body which could have some feedback function, nor was there any coherent statement of what one had to do to ‘pass’ or what happened if one ‘failed’. These decisions were left to what appeared to be the arbitrary whim of a self-selected ‘council’….It was a training which reflected the notion of the ‘cause’; an unexamined belief system, which could only continue as long as it was insulated from the demands of the outside world…” (p.376).

Kernberg (1986), too, has offered a blistering critique of psychoanalytic education that he sees as ‘all too often conducted in an atmosphere of indoctrination rather than of open scientific exploration’ (p.799). The unconscious investment of the psychoanalytic institute in its founding fathers, and the limitations of what Kernberg terms ‘cross-sterilisation’ is described as: 

‘manifest in the suspicious and envious way in which new ideas are received, faculty fearfulness of expressing new ideas that might challenge local dogma, and the general collusion in public applause of rehashed formulations, while privately many depreciate the monotonous repetition of concepts that, by the same token, also reassure the faculty that nothing new is threatening their present convictions…’ (p.806, in Jacobs, 2002, p. 351). 

It seems unlikely, then, in the current climate of ‘managerialism’ previously referred to (Loewenthal, 2002), that training programmes will want to remove themselves from their legitimating and validating affiliation with universities. Perhaps it is timely to question how exactly we are to ensure ‘survival with enjoyment’ (Coltart 1993, p.3) within such settings. Just as within individual psychotherapeutic practice, where containment of projections is achieved by thoughtful ‘reverie’ (Bion 1962) and responsiveness rather than retaliation, so a team may need to find new ways of thinking about and containing some of the projected anxieties of the institution.

Morante (2005) has recently discussed the value of a weekly staff support group for nurses to reflect on the impact of organizational and structural change on their clinical work within the NHS. Given the emphasis within counselling psychology on reflective practice, it seems obvious that a similar work discussion group could be extremely useful, with or without an external consultant, in order to encourage reflective thinking about the team’s role and capacity to manage the changes to and demands of task requirements within a university setting. This is somewhat similar to the ‘culture of enquiry’ advocated by Main (1983) in relation to therapeutic communities that:

‘both requires and sanctions instruments of enquiry into personal and interpersonal and inter-system problems……..as these are expressed and arranged socially’ (p.217).

However, I would argue along with Rustin (2003) that the value of regular participant observation, report and reflection within work discussion groups does not depend on a specifically psychoanalytic outlook, but rather on a team’s willingness and sustained capacity to reflect on its emotional role and significance in the organization of which it is a member. We should not underestimate the difficulties in establishing and maintaining a ‘culture of enquiry’, given its function in destabilizing the kinds of organisational and social defence systems previously outlined. A focus on and genuine interest in the creative activity of team members and other departmental staff – rather than a sterile focus on ‘research output’ – is, I think, also essential, as is the ability of a team to retain mutually respectful links with other departmental members, retaining a regular presence in the day-to-day life of the institution despite, where this occurs, a sense of marginalization. 

However, I note with trepidation the oncoming statutory regulation of applied psychologists and the spiralling culture of professionalisation, standardization and commodification of the ‘talking therapies’. This onslaught of managerialism, whilst both reflecting and contributing to the current universal erosion of subjectivity within the public sphere will, I fear, also serve relentlessly to increase conscious and unconscious anxieties within universities. If counselling, psychotherapy and counselling psychology training programmes are to continue to be based there, I suggest that our professional bodies need urgently to establish the means by which to provide ongoing support for our teaching teams and to encourage them and their institutions to reflect on the difficulties of positioning and assimilating psychotherapeutic training within our institutions of higher education. Most importantly, we should expect, plan for and protect a ‘culture of enquiry’ within all training programmes which I think will inevitably be experienced as antithetical to the prevailing ‘market-place’ system operating within universities. 
It would be naïve to assume that the above will, of itself, resolve the issues I have raised: organizational change is notoriously hard to effect as Menzies –Lyth (1959) and Jacques (1955) first noted. Nor, I recognize, is a psychoanalytic perspective necessarily the only or best way of conceptualizing the difficulties I have outlined: it will certainly not be the most popular. Indeed the universal potential for destructiveness that is an inherent part of the psychoanalytic ‘world view’ (Schafer 1976) is antithetical to the more benign, humanistic underpinnings characteristic of many counselling and counselling psychology philosophies which perhaps allow for a more optimistic view of human nature. 
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